Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.IV/MC.II/WP.11
31 August 1990

Original: ENGLISH

Geneva
20 August - 14 September 1990

SUGGESTED ELEMENTS FOR FINAL DOCUMENT LANGUAGE ON ARTICLE III OF THE NPT

Working Paper presented by Iran (Islamic Republic of)

The Conference, recalls the recommendations of the Third Review Conference for full implementation of Article III, in order to strengthen further barriers to proliferation and provide assurance of compliance with non-proliferation undertakings.

The Conference affirms its determination to strengthen further the barriers against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices to additional States. The Non-Nuclear Weapon State parties remain convinced that the universal adherence to the NPT is subject to the full compliance of Nuclear Weapon State parties to the Treaty, in particular the provisions of Articles I, VI.

The Conference expresses the conviction that IAEA safeguards provide assurance that Non-Nuclear Weapon State parties are complying with their undertakings under Article III and assist States in demonstrating this compliance. IAEA could, however, only play a role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices by safeguarding the peaceful nuclear facilities, due to its limited statutary functional domain. The military nuclear facilities and nuclear materials of Nuclear Weapon States are outside the scope of the IAEA's Safeguards.

The Conference commends the IAEA on its implementation of safeguards pursuant to this Treaty. It notes continued improvements in safeguards cost effectiveness and efficiency. It emphasizes the importance of maintaining a staff of the highest professional standard with due regard to the call for an increase of safeguards inspectors from developing countries.

The Conference notes with satisfaction that since the last Review Conference, the IAEA has again, in carrying out its safeguards activities, not detected any diversion of a significant amount of safeguarded material to the production of nuclear weapons, other nuclear explosive devices or to purposes unknown.

GE.90-69885

The Conference calls upon South Africa and Israel to put all nuclear facilities under the IAEA's full scope safeguards, as envisaged in the IAEA's resolutions.

The Conference notes the request of the Director General of the IAEA for States to facilitate the designation of inspectors, and calls on States to respond as fully as possible so as to maximize the efficient use of Agency inspection resources.

The Conference recognizes the importance of State systems of accounting and control to the efficient and effective application of safeguards, and urges continued improvements in this area including with the valuable assistance of IAEA and national programmes of training in such systems. It also notes in this regard the complementary and important role of national export and import control mechanisms.

The Conference calls upon States Party to continue their political, technical and financial support of the IAEA safeguards system in order to ensure that the IAEA is able to meet its international legal obligations pursuant to safeguards agreements under the Treaty, and its increasing safeguards responsibilities.